О понимании и свидетельстве
Журнал «KANT: Social Sciences & Humanities Series» №4(12) 2022 [стр. 29-48]
DOI: 10.24923/2305-8757.2022-12.3
Ключевые слова: знание; свидетельство; понимание; эпистемологические практики.
Свидетельство распространяет информацию. Также общепризнано, что оно может передавать знания. Может ли оно работать как эпистемологический источник понимания, является предметом спора. Однако свидетельство, безусловно, играет ключевую роль в распространении понимания в эпистемологическом сообществе. Но как именно мы учимся и как продвигаемся в понимании на основе слов друг друга? И что мы можем сделать, чтобы максимизировать вероятность того, что процесс получения взаимопонимания увенчается успехом? Это очень важные вопросы в нашем нынешнем эпистемологическом ландшафте, особенно в свете того внимания, которое уделялось пониманию как эпистемическому достижению чисто эпистемологической ценности. Несколько удивительно, что современная литература по социальной эпистемологии мало что предлагает по этой теме. Всеобъемлющая цель этой статьи состоит в том, чтобы предоставить предварительную модель понимания, достаточно глубокую, чтобы безопасно ответить на вопрос о том, как понимание и свидетельство связаны друг с другом. Мы надеемся в какой-то мере способствовать детерминации понимания и объяснить два факта о наших эпистемологических практиках: (1) тот факт, что знание и понимание по-разному соотносятся со свидетельством, и (2) тот факт, что некоторые фрагменты информации о свидетельствах лучше, чем другие, ради обеспечения понимания и достижения прогресса в своем эпистемологическом положении.
Литература:
Baumberger, C., Beisbart, C., & Brun, G. (2016). What is understanding? In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 1-34). London: Routledge.
Boyd, K. (2017). Testifying Understanding. Episteme, 14(1), 103-127.
Carter, A., & Gordon, E. (2016). Objectual understanding, factivity and belief. In M. Grajner & P. Schmechtig (Eds.), Epistemic reasons, norms and goals (pp. 423-442). Berlin: De Gruyter.
De Regt, H. W. (2017). Understanding scientific understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
De Regt, H. W., & Gijsbers, V. (2016). How false theories can yield genuine understanding. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 50-75). London: Routledge.
Elgin, C. Z. (2007a). Education and the advancement of understanding. In R. Curren (Ed.), Philosophy of education (pp. 417-422). Malden: Blackwell.
Elgin, C. Z. (2007b). Understanding and the facts. Philosophical Studies, 132(1), 33-42.
Elgin, C. Z. (2012). Understanding tethers. In C. Jаger & W. Lоffler (Eds.), Contexts, values, disagreement: Proceedings of the 34th international Wittgenstein symposium (pp. 131-146). Heusenstamm: Ontos.
Elgin, C. Z. (2017). True enough. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gordon, E. (2016). Social epistemology and the acquisition of understanding. In R. G. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 293-317). London: Routledge.
Greco, J. (2014). Episteme: knowledge and understanding. In K. Timpe & C. A. Boyd (Eds.), Virtues and their vices (pp. 285-302). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grimm, S. (2011). Understanding. In D. Pritchard & S. Bernecker (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology. New York and London: Routledge.
Grimm, S. (2014). Understanding as knowledge of causes. In A. Fairweather (Ed.), Virtue epistemology naturalized: bridges between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science (synthese library) (pp. 329-345). New York: Springer.
Grimm, S. (2017). Why study history? On its epistemic benefits and its relation to the sciences. Philosophy, 92, 399-420.
Grimm, S. (2019). Transmitting testimony and know-how. In S. Hetherington & N. Smith (Eds.), What the ancients offer to contemporary epistemology. New York: Routledge.
Hills, A. (2009). Moral testimony and moral epistemology. Ethics, 120, 94-127.
Hills, A. (2015). Understanding why. No?s. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12092.
Kelp, C. (2016). Towards a knowledge-based account of understanding. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 251-271). New York and London: Routledge.
Khalifa, K. (2012). Inaugurating understanding or repackaging explanation? Philosophy of Science, 79, 15-37.
Knavig, J. (2003). The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Le Bihan, S. (2016). Enlightening falsehoods: A modal view of scientific understanding. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 111-135). New York and London: Routledge.
Malfatti, F. I. (2019). Can testimony generate understanding? Social Epistemology. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2019.1628319.
Pritchard, D. (2010). Knowledge and understanding. In A. A. Millar & A. Haddock (Eds.), The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations (pp. 1-88). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schurz, G., & Lambert, K. (1994). Outline of a Theory of Scientific Understanding. Synthese, 101(1), 65-120.
Sloman, S., & Fernbach, P. (2017). The knowledge illusion: Why we never think alone. New York: Riverhead Books.
Stanley, J., & Williamson, T. (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411-444.
Strevens, M. (2016). How idealizations provide understanding. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 37-49). New York and London: Routledge.
Trout, J. D. (2002). Scientific explanation and the sense of understanding. Philosophy of Science, 69(2), 212-233.
Ylikovski, P. (2009). The illusion of depth of understanding in science. In H. W. De Regt, S. Leonelli, & K. Eigner (Eds.), Scientific understanding: Philosophical perspectives (pp. 100-119). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Zagzebski, L. T. (2009). On epistemology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Baumberger, C., Beisbart, C., & Brun, G. (2016). What is understanding? In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 1-34). London: Routledge.
Boyd, K. (2017). Testifying Understanding. Episteme, 14(1), 103-127.
Carter, A., & Gordon, E. (2016). Objectual understanding, factivity and belief. In M. Grajner & P. Schmechtig (Eds.), Epistemic reasons, norms and goals (pp. 423-442). Berlin: De Gruyter.
De Regt, H. W. (2017). Understanding scientific understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
De Regt, H. W., & Gijsbers, V. (2016). How false theories can yield genuine understanding. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 50-75). London: Routledge.
Elgin, C. Z. (2007a). Education and the advancement of understanding. In R. Curren (Ed.), Philosophy of education (pp. 417-422). Malden: Blackwell.
Elgin, C. Z. (2007b). Understanding and the facts. Philosophical Studies, 132(1), 33-42.
Elgin, C. Z. (2012). Understanding tethers. In C. Jаger & W. Lоffler (Eds.), Contexts, values, disagreement: Proceedings of the 34th international Wittgenstein symposium (pp. 131-146). Heusenstamm: Ontos.
Elgin, C. Z. (2017). True enough. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gordon, E. (2016). Social epistemology and the acquisition of understanding. In R. G. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 293-317). London: Routledge.
Greco, J. (2014). Episteme: knowledge and understanding. In K. Timpe & C. A. Boyd (Eds.), Virtues and their vices (pp. 285-302). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grimm, S. (2011). Understanding. In D. Pritchard & S. Bernecker (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology. New York and London: Routledge.
Grimm, S. (2014). Understanding as knowledge of causes. In A. Fairweather (Ed.), Virtue epistemology naturalized: bridges between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science (synthese library) (pp. 329-345). New York: Springer.
Grimm, S. (2017). Why study history? On its epistemic benefits and its relation to the sciences. Philosophy, 92, 399-420.
Grimm, S. (2019). Transmitting testimony and know-how. In S. Hetherington & N. Smith (Eds.), What the ancients offer to contemporary epistemology. New York: Routledge.
Hills, A. (2009). Moral testimony and moral epistemology. Ethics, 120, 94-127.
Hills, A. (2015). Understanding why. No?s. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12092.
Kelp, C. (2016). Towards a knowledge-based account of understanding. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 251-271). New York and London: Routledge.
Khalifa, K. (2012). Inaugurating understanding or repackaging explanation? Philosophy of Science, 79, 15-37.
Knavig, J. (2003). The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Le Bihan, S. (2016). Enlightening falsehoods: A modal view of scientific understanding. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 111-135). New York and London: Routledge.
Malfatti, F. I. (2019). Can testimony generate understanding? Social Epistemology. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2019.1628319.
Pritchard, D. (2010). Knowledge and understanding. In A. A. Millar & A. Haddock (Eds.), The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations (pp. 1-88). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schurz, G., & Lambert, K. (1994). Outline of a Theory of Scientific Understanding. Synthese, 101(1), 65-120.
Sloman, S., & Fernbach, P. (2017). The knowledge illusion: Why we never think alone. New York: Riverhead Books.
Stanley, J., & Williamson, T. (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411-444.
Strevens, M. (2016). How idealizations provide understanding. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding (pp. 37-49). New York and London: Routledge.
Trout, J. D. (2002). Scientific explanation and the sense of understanding. Philosophy of Science, 69(2), 212-233.
Ylikovski, P. (2009). The illusion of depth of understanding in science. In H. W. De Regt, S. Leonelli, & K. Eigner (Eds.), Scientific understanding: Philosophical perspectives (pp. 100-119). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Zagzebski, L. T. (2009). On epistemology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
On Understanding and Testimony
Keywords: knowledge; certificate; understanding; epistemological practices.
Testimony spreads information. It is also commonly agreed that it can transfer knowledge. Whether it can work as an epistemic source of understanding is a matter of dispute. However, testimony certainly plays a pivotal role in the proliferation of understanding in the epistemic community. But how exactly do we learn, and how do we make advancements in understanding on the basis of one another's words? And what can we do to maximize the probability that the process of acquiring understanding from one another succeeds? These are very important questions in our current epistemological landscape, especially in light of the attention that has been paid to understanding as an epistemic achievement of purely epistemic value. Somewhat surprisingly, the recent literature in social epistemology does not offer much on the topic. The overarching aim of this paper is to provide a tentative model of understanding that goes in-depth enough to safely address the question of how understanding and testimony are related to one another. The hope is to contribute, in some measure, to the effort to understand understanding, and to explain two facts about our epistemic practices: (1) the fact that knowledge and understanding relate differently to testimony, and (2) the fact that some pieces of testimonial information are better than others for the sake of providing one with understanding and of yielding advancements in one's epistemic standing.
Malfatti, F.I. On Understanding and Testimony. Erkenn 86, 1345-1365 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00157-8
Malfatti, F.I. On Understanding and Testimony. Erkenn 86, 1345-1365 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00157-8