Концептуальная этика, метаэпистемология и нормативная эпистемология
Журнал «KANT: Social Sciences & Humanities Series» №1(9) 2022 [стр. 65-80]
DOI: 10.24923/2305-8757.2022-9.6
Ключевые слова: эпистемология; концептуальная этика; метаэпистемология.
В этой статье рекламируется важность разграничения трех разных основополагающих проектов эпистемологического мышления и разговоров, которые мы называем "систематической нормативной эпистемологией", "метаэпистемологией" и "концептуальной этикой эпистемологии". Мы утверждаем, что эти проекты можно отличить по контрастным определяющим условиям успеха. Эта статья мотивирована идеей о том, что различия между этими тремя проектами важны для эпистемологического теоретизирования, но недооцениваются в философских дискуссиях. Мы утверждаем, что внимание к тройному различию, которое мы выдвигаем, позволяет нам лучше понять и оценить существующие взгляды и дискуссии в этой области; определить и оценить новые или недостаточно изученные теоретические возможности в этой области; и избежать важных дефектов и двусмысленностей в наших исследованиях по эпистемологическим темам.
* Публикуется перевод первого раздела статьи.
* Публикуется перевод первого раздела статьи.
Литература:
Alston, William. 2005. Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Berker, Selim. 2013. “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.” Philosophical Review 122 (3): 337–393.
Bishop, Michael A., and J. D. Trout. 2004. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen. 2020. “Varieties of Moral Encroachment.” Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1): 5–26. 30 T. MCPHERSON AND D. PLUNKETT
Burgess, Alexis, Herman Cappelen, and David Plunkett. 2020. Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett. 2013a. “Conceptual Ethics I.” Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1091–1101.
Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett. 2013b. “Conceptual Ethics II.” Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1102–1110.
Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett. 2020. “On the Relation Between Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics.” Ratio 33 (4): 281–294.
Burgess, Alexis, and Brett Sherman. 2014. Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cappelen, Herman. 2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cappelen, Herman, and David Plunkett. 2020. “A Guided Tour of Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics”. In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by A. Burgess, H. Cappelen, and D. Plunkett, 1–26. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2012. “Epistemic Expressivism.” Philosophy Compass 7 (2): 118–126.
Cohen, Stewart. 2016. “Theorizing About the Epistemic.” Inquiry 59 (7–8): 839–857.
Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman. 2004. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craig, Edward. 1990. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Darwall, Stephen L. 1998. Philosophical Ethics. Boulder: Westview Press.
DeRose, Keith. 2009. The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Descartes, René. 1641/2017. Meditations on First Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 2011. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Eklund, Matti. 2017. Choosing Normative Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fantl, Jeremy, and Matthew McGrath. 2009. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, Richard. 2003. Epistemology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Field, Hartry. 2000. “A Priority as an Evaluative Notion.” In New Essays on the A Priori, edited by P. A. Boghossian, and C. Peacocke, 117–149. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Field, Hartry. 2018. “Epistemology from an Evaluativist Perspective.” Philosophers’ Imprint 18.
Fritz, James. 2017. “Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1): 643–661.
Fritz, James. 2021. “Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1): 98–116.
Fritz, James. Forthcoming. “Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.” Erkenntnis. Fumerton, Richard. 2006. Epistemology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Gettier, Edmund L. 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23: 121–123.
Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. INQUIRY 31
Gibbard, Allan. 2012. Meaning and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1999. Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greco, Daniel. 2014. “A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.” Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 201–219.
Hannon, Michael. 2019. What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haslanger, Sally. 2000a. “Defining Knowledge: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology.” In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 8: Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Daniel Dahlstrom. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr.
Haslanger, Sally. 2000b. “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” Noûs 34 (1): 31–55.
Hawthorne, John, and Jason Stanley. 2008. “Knowledge and Action.” Journal of Philosophy 105 (10): 571–590.
Horowitz, Sophie. 2014. “Epistemic Akrasia.” Noûs 48 (4): 718–744.
Jackson, Frank. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon.
Kitcher, Philip. 1992. “The Naturalists Return.” The Philosophical Review 101 (1): 53–114.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2002. Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ludlow, Peter. 2014. Living Words: Meaning Undetermination and the Dynamic Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McHugh, Conor, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting. 2019. Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McPherson, Tristram. 2012. “Unifying Moral Methodology.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4): 523–549.
McPherson, Tristram. 2020. “Ardent Realism Without Referential Normativity.” Inquiry 63 (5): 489–508.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. 2017. “The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics.” In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by T. McPherson, and D. Plunkett, 1–25. New York: Routledge.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. 2020. “Conceptual Ethics and The Methodology of Normative Inquiry.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by A. Burgess, H. Cappelen, and D. Plunkett, 274–303. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. 2021. “Metaethics and the Conceptual Ethics of Normativity.” Inquiry.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. Forthcoming. “Evaluation Turned on Itself: The Vindicatory Circularity Challenge to the Conceptual Ethics of Normativity.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, edited by R. Shafer-Landau, Vol 16., 207–232. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. Manuscript. “On the Nature and Foundations of Epistemic Normativity.” Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. 1887/1994. On the Genealogy of Morality. New York: Cambridge University Press. 32 T. MCPHERSON AND D. PLUNKETT
Olson, Jonas. 2018. “Moral and Epistemic Error Theory: The Parity Premise Reconsidered.” In Metaepistemology, edited by C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting, 107–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pérez Carballo, Alejandro. 2020. “Conceptual Evaluation: Epistemic.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by A. Burgess, H. Cappelen, and D. Plunkett, 304–332. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Plunkett, David. 2015. “Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy.” Inquiry 58 (7-8): 828–874.
Plunkett, David. 2016. “Conceptual History, Conceptual Ethics, and the Aims of Inquiry: A Framework for Thinking About the Relevance of the History/Genealogy of Concepts to Normative Inquiry.” Ergo 3 (2): 27–64.
Plunkett, David. 2020. “Normative Roles, Conceptual Variance, and Ardent Realism About Normativity.” Inquiry 63 (5): 509–534.
Plunkett, David, and Scott Shapiro. 2017. “Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry.” Ethics 128 (1): 37–68.
Plunkett, David, and Tim Sundell. 2013a. “Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms.” Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (23): 1–37.
Plunkett, David, and Timothy Sundell. 2013b. “Dworkin’s Interpretivism and the Pragmatics of Legal Disputes.” Legal Theory 19 (3): 242–281.
Plunkett, David, and Tim Sundell. 2021. “Metalinguistic Negotiation and Speaker Error.” Inquiry 64 (1–2): 142–167.
Pritchard, Duncan. 2016. Knowledge. New York: Palgrave.
Scharp, Kevin. 2013. Replacing Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scharp, Kevin. 2020. “Defective Concepts.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by A. Burgess, H. Cappelen, and D. Plunkett. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scharp, Kevin. Manuscript. “Replacing Knowledge.”Schroeter, Laura, and Francois Schroeter. 2014. “Normative Concepts: A Connectedness Model.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14 (25): 1–26.
Sider, Theodore. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Streumer, Bart. 2017. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thomasson, Amie L. 2016. “Metaphysical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation.” Analytic Philosophy 57 (4): 1–28.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2018. “Normative Reference Magnets.” The Philosophical Review 127 (1): 41–71.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Alston, William. 2005. Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Berker, Selim. 2013. “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.” Philosophical Review 122 (3): 337–393.
Bishop, Michael A., and J. D. Trout. 2004. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen. 2020. “Varieties of Moral Encroachment.” Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1): 5–26. 30 T. MCPHERSON AND D. PLUNKETT
Burgess, Alexis, Herman Cappelen, and David Plunkett. 2020. Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett. 2013a. “Conceptual Ethics I.” Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1091–1101.
Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett. 2013b. “Conceptual Ethics II.” Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1102–1110.
Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett. 2020. “On the Relation Between Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics.” Ratio 33 (4): 281–294.
Burgess, Alexis, and Brett Sherman. 2014. Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cappelen, Herman. 2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cappelen, Herman, and David Plunkett. 2020. “A Guided Tour of Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics”. In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by A. Burgess, H. Cappelen, and D. Plunkett, 1–26. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2012. “Epistemic Expressivism.” Philosophy Compass 7 (2): 118–126.
Cohen, Stewart. 2016. “Theorizing About the Epistemic.” Inquiry 59 (7–8): 839–857.
Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman. 2004. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craig, Edward. 1990. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Darwall, Stephen L. 1998. Philosophical Ethics. Boulder: Westview Press.
DeRose, Keith. 2009. The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Descartes, René. 1641/2017. Meditations on First Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 2011. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Eklund, Matti. 2017. Choosing Normative Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fantl, Jeremy, and Matthew McGrath. 2009. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, Richard. 2003. Epistemology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Field, Hartry. 2000. “A Priority as an Evaluative Notion.” In New Essays on the A Priori, edited by P. A. Boghossian, and C. Peacocke, 117–149. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Field, Hartry. 2018. “Epistemology from an Evaluativist Perspective.” Philosophers’ Imprint 18.
Fritz, James. 2017. “Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1): 643–661.
Fritz, James. 2021. “Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1): 98–116.
Fritz, James. Forthcoming. “Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.” Erkenntnis. Fumerton, Richard. 2006. Epistemology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Gettier, Edmund L. 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23: 121–123.
Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. INQUIRY 31
Gibbard, Allan. 2012. Meaning and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1999. Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greco, Daniel. 2014. “A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.” Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 201–219.
Hannon, Michael. 2019. What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haslanger, Sally. 2000a. “Defining Knowledge: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology.” In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 8: Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Daniel Dahlstrom. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr.
Haslanger, Sally. 2000b. “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” Noûs 34 (1): 31–55.
Hawthorne, John, and Jason Stanley. 2008. “Knowledge and Action.” Journal of Philosophy 105 (10): 571–590.
Horowitz, Sophie. 2014. “Epistemic Akrasia.” Noûs 48 (4): 718–744.
Jackson, Frank. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon.
Kitcher, Philip. 1992. “The Naturalists Return.” The Philosophical Review 101 (1): 53–114.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2002. Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ludlow, Peter. 2014. Living Words: Meaning Undetermination and the Dynamic Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McHugh, Conor, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting. 2019. Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McPherson, Tristram. 2012. “Unifying Moral Methodology.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4): 523–549.
McPherson, Tristram. 2020. “Ardent Realism Without Referential Normativity.” Inquiry 63 (5): 489–508.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. 2017. “The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics.” In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by T. McPherson, and D. Plunkett, 1–25. New York: Routledge.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. 2020. “Conceptual Ethics and The Methodology of Normative Inquiry.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by A. Burgess, H. Cappelen, and D. Plunkett, 274–303. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. 2021. “Metaethics and the Conceptual Ethics of Normativity.” Inquiry.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. Forthcoming. “Evaluation Turned on Itself: The Vindicatory Circularity Challenge to the Conceptual Ethics of Normativity.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, edited by R. Shafer-Landau, Vol 16., 207–232. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. Manuscript. “On the Nature and Foundations of Epistemic Normativity.” Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. 1887/1994. On the Genealogy of Morality. New York: Cambridge University Press. 32 T. MCPHERSON AND D. PLUNKETT
Olson, Jonas. 2018. “Moral and Epistemic Error Theory: The Parity Premise Reconsidered.” In Metaepistemology, edited by C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting, 107–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pérez Carballo, Alejandro. 2020. “Conceptual Evaluation: Epistemic.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by A. Burgess, H. Cappelen, and D. Plunkett, 304–332. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Plunkett, David. 2015. “Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy.” Inquiry 58 (7-8): 828–874.
Plunkett, David. 2016. “Conceptual History, Conceptual Ethics, and the Aims of Inquiry: A Framework for Thinking About the Relevance of the History/Genealogy of Concepts to Normative Inquiry.” Ergo 3 (2): 27–64.
Plunkett, David. 2020. “Normative Roles, Conceptual Variance, and Ardent Realism About Normativity.” Inquiry 63 (5): 509–534.
Plunkett, David, and Scott Shapiro. 2017. “Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry.” Ethics 128 (1): 37–68.
Plunkett, David, and Tim Sundell. 2013a. “Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms.” Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (23): 1–37.
Plunkett, David, and Timothy Sundell. 2013b. “Dworkin’s Interpretivism and the Pragmatics of Legal Disputes.” Legal Theory 19 (3): 242–281.
Plunkett, David, and Tim Sundell. 2021. “Metalinguistic Negotiation and Speaker Error.” Inquiry 64 (1–2): 142–167.
Pritchard, Duncan. 2016. Knowledge. New York: Palgrave.
Scharp, Kevin. 2013. Replacing Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scharp, Kevin. 2020. “Defective Concepts.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by A. Burgess, H. Cappelen, and D. Plunkett. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scharp, Kevin. Manuscript. “Replacing Knowledge.”Schroeter, Laura, and Francois Schroeter. 2014. “Normative Concepts: A Connectedness Model.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14 (25): 1–26.
Sider, Theodore. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Streumer, Bart. 2017. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thomasson, Amie L. 2016. “Metaphysical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation.” Analytic Philosophy 57 (4): 1–28.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2018. “Normative Reference Magnets.” The Philosophical Review 127 (1): 41–71.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Conceptual ethics, metaepistemology, and normative epistemology
Keywords: Epistemology; conceptual ethics; metaepistemology.
This paper advertises the importance of distinguishing three different foundational projects about epistemic thought and talk, which we call "systematic normative epistemology", "metaepistemology", and "the conceptual ethics of epistemology". We argue that these projects can be distinguished by their contrasting constitutive success conditions. This paper is motivated by the idea that the distinctions between these three projects matter for epistemological theorizing in ways that have been underappreciated in philosophical discussion. We claim that attention to the threefold distinction we advance allows us to better understand and evaluate existing views and debates in the field; identify and appreciate new or underexplored theoretical options in the field; and avoid important defects and ambiguities in our research on epistemic topics.